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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S USE OF CELL TOWER DUMPS IN ITS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
*

The Honorable Brian L. Owsley

Privacy concerns resonate with the American people. Although
the right to privacy is not explicitly protected in the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court has found the right to privacy root1
ed within the Constitution based on various amendments. In the
modern era, with rapid advances in technology, threats to privacy
abound, including new surveillance methods by law enforcement.
There is a growing tension between an individual’s right to privacy
and our collective right to public safety. This latter right is often protected by law enforcement’s use of electronic surveillance as an investigative tool, but such surveillance may at times be done in a way that
is inconsistent with constitutional rights.
Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union brought to light the
popular use of government surveillance of cell phones, including the
gathering of all cell phone numbers utilizing a specific cell site loca2
tion. Known as a “cell tower dump,” such procedures essentially ob*
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tain all of the telephone number records from a particular cell site
tower for a given time period: “A tower dump allows police to request the phone numbers of all phones that connected to a specific
3
tower within a given period of time.” State and federal courts have
4
barely addressed cell tower dumps. However, the actions by most of
the largest cell phone providers, as well as personal experience and
conversations with other magistrate judges, strongly suggest “that it
has become a relatively routine investigative technique” for law en5
forcement officials.
No federal statute directly addresses whether and how law enforcement officers may seek a cell tower dump from cellular telephone providers. Assistant United States Attorneys, with the encouragement of the United States Department of Justice, apply for court
orders authorizing cell tower dumps pursuant to a provision in the
6
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. The pertinent provision poses a procedural hurdle less stringent than a warrant based
on probable cause, which in turn raises significant constitutional
concerns.
This Article provides a brief description of cellular telephone and
cell-site technology in Part I. Next, Part II addresses the evolution of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and argues that the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard applies to electronic surveillance such

3

4

5

6

Nationwide Cell Phone Tracking Public Record Requests Findings and Analysis (Mar. 31,
2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/cell_phone_tracking_documents__final.pdf.
Jeffrey Brown, What Type of Process is Required for a Cell Tower Dump?, CYBERCRIME REV.
(May 16, 2012), http://www.cybercrimereview.com/2012/05/what-type-of-process-isrequired-for.html.
There are only a few decisions discussing this surveillance technique in the United States.
See United States v. Duffey, No. 3:08-CR-0167-B, 2009 WL 2356156, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July
30, 2009); Jackson v. State, 716 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 2011). In Canada, there is also a reported case addressing cellular telephone records obtained through a cell tower dump.
See generally R. v. Mahmood (2008), 2008 CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236
C.C.C. 3d 3, 79 W.C.B. 2d 366 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J. 2008), aff’d 2011 CanLII 693 (Can.
Ont. C.A. 2011). Since the inception of this Article, I have issued two decisions denying
requests for cell tower dumps and one decision granting a request for a cell tower dump.
See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D), No. C-13497M, 2013 WL 1934491 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2013) (denying); In re Search of Cellular Telephone Towers, Nos. C-13-523M, C-13-525M, C-13-526M, C-13-527M, C-13-528M, 2013
WL 1932881 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2013) (granting); In re United States ex rel. Order Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D), Nos. C-12-670M, C-12-671M, C-12-672M, C-12-673M, 2012 WL
4717778 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012) (denying).
Timothy B. Lee, Documents Show Cops Making up the Rules on Mobile Surveillance, ARS
TECHNICA
(Apr.
3,
2012,
10:40
AM.),
http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/04/documents-show-cops-making-up-the-rules-on-mobile-surveillance/.
Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
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as cell tower dumps. In Part III, the discussion follows the development of statutes addressing electronic surveillance and posits that cell
tower dumps request more information than simply telephone numbers. Part IV analyzes records from both cellular service providers
and the federal government to conclude that cell tower dumps routinely occur. Part V assesses the few decisions that discuss cell tower
dumps and argues that the constitutional analysis is either nonexistent or flawed regarding the use of the Stored Communications
Act to permit cell tower dumps. Next, Part VI asserts that cell tower
dumps cannot be analyzed pursuant to the Stored Communications
Act because the language of the statute is inapplicable and the
amount of information sought requires a warrant based on probable
cause. This Part concludes by proposing some protocols to safeguard
individual privacy rights.
I. CELL SITE TOWERS GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT ALL CELLULAR
TELEPHONES OPERATING WITHIN THEIR RADII
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which in part concerned the then new technology of cellular
7
telephones that were based on radio transmission. In order for these
telephones to function, cellular telephone providers operate “large
service areas [that] are divided into honeycomb-shaped segments or
‘cells’—each of which is equipped with a low-power transmitter or
base station which can receive and radiate messages within its param8
eters.” One commenter has described cell site data as
a collection of a number of pieces of data “regarding the strength, angle,
and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or more cell sites, as
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See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority (Southern Texas Order 1), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“A cell phone
is a sophisticated two-way radio with a low-power transmitter that operates in a network of
cell sites.”); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (Southern Texas Order 2),
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“[C]ellular telephones use radio waves to
communicate between the user’s handset and the telephone network.”).
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986); see also Southern Texas Order 1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750
(“‘Cell’ refers to geographic regions often illustrated as hexagons, resembling a bee’s
honeycomb; a ‘cell site’ is where the radio transceiver and base station controller are located (at the point three hexagons meet.”); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian,
Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 126 (2012) (“Service providers
maintain large numbers of radio base stations (also called ‘cell sites’) spread throughout
their geographic coverage areas. These cell sites are generally located on ‘cell towers’
serving geographic areas of varying sizes, depending upon topography and population
concentration.”).
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well as other system information such as a listing of all cell towers in the
9
market area, switching technology, protocols, and network architecture.”

At each cell (or cell site), there is a wireless antenna that “detects
the radio signal from the handset, and connects it to the local tele10
Alphone network, the Internet, or another wireless network.”
though many cell sites are physically located on towers, they can also
be placed on trees, roofs, flagpoles, the sides of buildings, or even in11
side buildings. Smaller cell site units known as microcells, picocells,
or femtocells are typically used in buildings operating with much
12
smaller service areas to boost coverage and decrease dead zones.
Whenever someone uses a cellular telephone, it triggers a series of
relays along the cell-site network:
When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver sends
signals over the air on a radio frequency to a cell site. From there the
signal travels over phone lines or a microwave to a computerized mobile
telephone switching office (“MTSO”) or station. The MTSO automatically and inaudibly switches the conversation from one base station and
one frequency to another as the portable telephone . . . moves from cell
13
to cell.

The number of cell sites in a geographical area depends in part on
the density of cell phone users. Thus, typically in rural areas, there
9

10
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Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology and the
Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442, 478 (2011)
(quoting Southern Texas Order 1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749).
Southern Texas Order 2, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
Id. (“No longer just big three-sided radio towers, base station antennas can be mounted
outdoors on roof-tops, building-sides, trees, flagpoles, and church steeples, or indoors in
homes and offices.”).
See, e.g., N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (addressing microcells and distributed antenna systems); Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 586 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing a potential use of
microcells); Southern Texas Order 2, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (explaining the accuracy and
precision of the new technologies); ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Professor
Matt Blaze), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111109_57082.pdf (stating that the increase of cellular base towers has “accelerated with the
deployment of the latest generation of smaller and smaller-scale base stations . . . designed to serve very small areas ”); Lachlan Paige, Mapping Human Behavior:
How Cell Tower Data, Social Media Geolocation and Pattern Analysis Help Investigators, 38 LAW
ENFORCEMENT TECH. 24, 29 (2011) (“‘Picocells’—smaller sites that have 360-degree coverage and are mounted on telephone poles rather than taking up land—are a costeffective solution for carriers that want to boost signal without building or leasing new
towers.”).
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986); see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 127 (“[M]obile
telephones (as their name suggests) are portable, and so when a phone moves away from
the cell site with which it started a call and nearer to a different cell site, the call is ‘handed over’ from one cell site to another without interruption.”).
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will be fewer cell sites, while in large cities there will be many more
cell sites. Any time a person’s cell phone is turned on, that telephone
is sending out a signal testing what is the nearest cell site, which in
14
turn registers with that cell site. “This process, called ‘registration’,
15
[sic] occurs approximately every seven seconds.” Registration enables cellular providers to obtain a plethora of information about the
telephones contacting their cell sites.
Cellular telephone providers have to be able to gather and store
information through registration regarding cell phones that interact
with their cell towers. “In order to provide service to cellular telephones, providers have the technical capability to collect information
such as the cell tower nearest to a particular cell phone, the portion
of that tower facing the phone, and often the signal strength of the
16
phone.” These providers “generally keep detailed historical records
17
of this information for billing and other business purposes.” Indeed, depending on various factors, this information can be used to
18
determine a phone’s location to within a few hundred yards.
14
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ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services, supra note 12 at
13–14.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Commc’n Serv.
to Disclose Records to the Gov’t (Western Pennsylvania Order), 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590
(W.D. Pa. 2008) (footnote omitted), rev’d and vacated on other grounds (Third Circuit Order),
620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010).
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, at 41 (rev. 2005) [hereinafter
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf; see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing
the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information (Eastern New York Order 1), 809 F. Supp. 2d
113, 115 (E.D.N.Y 2011) (“Cell phones work by communicating with cell-sites operated by
cell-phone service providers. Each cell-site operates at a certain location and covers a certain range of distance.”). Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission has issued
regulations that “require cellular service providers to upgrade their systems to identify
more precisely the longitude and latitude of mobile units making emergency 911 calls.”
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Information of
a Specified Wireless Telephone (Maryland Order 1), 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 532 (D. Md.
Aug. 3, 2011); see also 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (setting accuracy standards for cell phone calls
within targeted distances).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, at 41; see also In re Application of U.S.
for and [sic] Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Authorizing
the Disclosure of Location-Based Services (Western Texas Order), 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 573
(W.D. Tex. 2010) (“[Cell site location information] is information that resides on computer servers of telecommunications providers.”); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 128
(“Wireless service providers retain detailed logs for diagnostic, billing, and other purposes.”).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, at 41; see also Eastern New York Order 1,
809 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (explaining that several factors, including population density, determine the distance between cell sites); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 176 (“[T]he
precision of the location information these technologies produce has increased dramati-
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A law enforcement official requesting a cell tower dump seeks to
collect all of the historical records that providers maintain from a
specific cell tower or towers. These “records provide a listing of any
cell phones that have utilized the cell phone tower for a particular
19
time and date.” As with all historical cell site data, these records do
not establish an exact location, but instead give a general location of
20
the cell phone. As one wireless technology expert explained, cell
tower dumps “can be especially useful with serial crimes such as home
invasions, robberies or sexual assaults, because tower dumps for each
crime location can be cross-referenced for numbers that come up in
21
all locations.” Significantly, with the increased usage of picocells
and femtocells, historical cell-site information can be as accurate as
22
GPS, and in some cases even more accurate.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE HAS EVOLVED TO PROTECT
SEARCHES BASED ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The Founders enshrined within the Fourth Amendment “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
23
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” It further
24
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
When the privacy implicated by the Fourth Amendment is involved
and law enforcement agents are conducting a “search and seizure,”
the Supreme Court has indicated that a warrant is generally neces25
sary.

19
20
21

22

23
24
25

cally, such that a single cell tower data—particularly where enhanced by some of the
350,000 femtocells deployed around the country—is becoming as accurate as GPS.”) (citing In re 2010 S.D. Tex. Application, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Press Release, Informa Telecoms & Media, The Shape of Mobile Networks Starts to Change as
Femtocells Outnumber Macrocells in U.S. (Oct. 21, 2010), available at
http://femtoforum.org/fema/pressreleases.php?id=269).
Criminal Complaint at 13, United States v. Capito (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2010) (No. 3:10-CR8050).
Id.
Christa Miller, Why and How to Add Mapping to Your Cell Phone Evidence, COMM. TECH. SERV.
(July 19, 2011), http://cops2point0.com/2011/07/why-how-add-mapping-your-cellphone-evidence/comment-page-1/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
Christopher Soghoian, Technologies of Tracking: An Introduction, Yale Information Society
Project, Location Tracking and Biometrics Conference (Mar. 3, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwutGSjNQ0k.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (addressing the issuance of warrants, including for the seizure of electronically stored information).
See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (“[T]he most basic
constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
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Of course, when the Fourth Amendment was originally contemplated, electronic surveillance was not an issue. Over time, the
Fourth Amendment has been construed to extend protection from
warrantless searches in numerous contexts as technological devices
have developed. This development informs our view of the constitutional implications of cell tower dumps.
Originally, Fourth Amendment protections covered physically invasive searches, particularly of homes, but were eventually extended
26
to cover intangibles. Upon being jailed, the petitioner in Ex parte
Jackson filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for using the postal system to send a circular advertising a lottery that of27
fered prizes in violation of federal law. The Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search and seizure of
28
mail in the postal service’s custody. The Jackson Court explained, in
dicta, that mail that had been sealed was subject to protection from
unreasonable search and seizure:
Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as
if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure
in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.
Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like
warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search
in one’s own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of

26

27
28

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also William W.
Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1041 (1994) (“A long
line of cases from 1789-1958 recognized that for a search to be valid under the Fourth
Amendment, that search must either be pursuant to a valid warrant or fall within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (espousing the position that
searches do not require a warrant per se but instead must be reasonable); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court to
Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 77, 94–95 (2007) (describing how the Court has been unwilling to adopt a per se
warrant approach with a strong warrant requirement).
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–28 (1886) (holding that it does not require
actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“From the date of its
ratification until well into the 20th century, violation of the [Fourth] Amendment was
tied to common-law trespass.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001)).
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
Id. at 728 (citing Rev. St. § 3894).
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officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations
adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the
29
great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution.

The Court ultimately denied the petition challenging a law that
30
barred using the federal mail to send lottery circulars. Significantly,
however, this dictum extended Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
private communications.
The evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence continued
with Boyd v. United States. The Supreme Court considered whether
the “compulsory production of a man’s private papers, to be used in
evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws . . . [constitutes] an ‘unreasonable
search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend31
ment . . . .” Ultimately, the Court held that the order to produce
the invoice as well as the law authorizing its production were unconstitutional, so the judgment was reversed and remanded for a new tri32
al. The decisions in Boyd and Jackson laid the framework for the
property-centric theory that guided Fourth Amendment jurisprudence well into the twentieth century.
When the Supreme Court first dealt with a challenge to the use of
telephone wiretaps, it held that there was no Fourth Amendment vio33
lation. In Olmstead, the government was investigating a conspiracy
34
to possess and sell alcohol during Prohibition. During this investigation, “[s]mall wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone
wires from the residences of four of the petitioners and those leading
from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass up35
on any property of the defendants.” Chief Justice William Howard
Taft explained that persons subscribing to telephone service intend
to project their voices outside their residences:
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common
law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment. The
29

30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 733; see also Wesley MacNeil Oliver, America’s First Wiretapping Controversy in Context
and as Context, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 210–15 (2011) (discussing the historical context
of this dicta).
Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736–37.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 638.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 455–56.
Id. at 456–57.
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reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite
outside, and that the wires beyond his house and messages while passing
over them are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Here those who intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of
36
either party to the conversation.

Instead, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence required a more narrow
interpretation so that a violation occurred only when “there has been
an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion
37
of his house . . . .” Consequently, the Court held “that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the
38
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
In dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis predicted that “‘in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has
been but of what may be.’ The progress of science in furnishing the
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire39
Of course, as technology developed, Justice Brandeis’
tapping.”
cautionary words proved to be quite accurate.
Furthering the reasoning of Olmstead, in Goldman v. United States,
the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a conviction for essentially
40
conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of the Bankruptcy Act. After federal agents learned of an attempt by some lawyers to perpetrate a fraud on the bankruptcy court, they began an investigation into the fraud. Two agents, with the building manager’s assistance but
without a warrant, obtained access to the defendant’s office at night
and “installed a listening apparatus in a small aperture in the partition wall, with a wire to be attached to earphones extending into the
41
adjoining office.” However, when “[t]hey connected the earphones
42
to the apparatus . . . it would not work.”
Not to be deterred, the agents set up surveillance using a detectaphone placed against the wall of one of the attorney’s offices to listen
to and record, with the assistance of a stenographer, conversations

36
37

38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 466. This approach toward “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.” United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); but see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth
Amendment Searches, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 69 (2012).
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Id. at 131.
Id.

10

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

regarding the conspiracy.43 Thus, instead of physically entering into
the defendant’s office, this device was operated from another office
which the agents did not need a warrant to access. Analyzing the surveillance, the Court explained that
[t]he listening in the next room to the words of [one attorneyconspirator] as he talked into the telephone receiver was no more the interception of a wire communication, within the meaning of the Act, than
would have been the overhearing of the conversation by one sitting in
44
the same room.

Indeed, unlike the use of any information that would have been obtained by the original apparatus that failed, there was no trespass with
45
the use of the detectaphone. Because there was no invasion of the
office, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
Almost forty years after Olmstead, the Supreme Court, in Katz v.
United States, addressed whether surveillance of a public telephone
booth violated the Fourth Amendment. FBI agents were investigating
the defendant for using a wire communication to engage in illegal
46
These agents did not wiretap the telephone
gambling activity.
booth where the defendant made his phone calls, but instead “attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
47
the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.” At
trial, the prosecutor played these recordings over the defendant’s ob48
jection.
The Katz Court determined that Olmstead was no longer control49
ling because its reasoning had been eroded by subsequent decisions.
Justice Potter Stewart explained that a person who enters a telephone
booth, “occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words
50
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”

43
44
45
46
47

48
49

50

Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134–35.
389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
Id. Although Katz was not a wiretap case, the Supreme Court had just enunciated the
standards for a constitutional wiretap statute earlier in the Term. Berger v. United States,
388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (striking down New York’s wiretap law).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 353; see also Eastern New York Order 1, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Katz decision “drastically changed existing Fourth Amendment doctrine”).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has explained that while Katz amplified the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it did not repudiate the historical trespass approach. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 821 (2004) (“Exactly
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He continued by noting that “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
51
play in private communication.” Consequently, the Court concluded that “[t]he Government’s activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
52
Amendment.”
More than forty years later, in City of Ontario v. Quon, a rare decision by the Supreme Court concerning the Stored Communications
Act, Justice Anthony Kennedy addressed the Court’s reversal of
Olmstead in Katz, explaining that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
53
technology before its role in society has become clear.” This cautious approach contrasts with the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment
that its decisions regarding electronic surveillance must also consider
new developments in that surveillance. For example, when the Court
found the use of heat-sensing technology to be a search in Kyllo v.
United States, it announced that “[w]hile the technology used in the
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in develop54
These two divergent approaches addressed in Quon and
ment.”
Kyllo demonstrate the tension and difficulty the Supreme Court and,
consequently, the lower courts face regarding the collection of telephone numbers and other information through cell tower dumps.
People tend to expect that their locations, including those disclosed by historical cell-site data, are not readily accessible to law enforcement. The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
55
The Supreme Court has conconsider reasonable is infringed.”
cluded that this reasonable expectation extends to various areas that

51
52
53

54
55

why the user of the phone booth was constitutionally entitled to his privacy was left to the
reader’s imagination.”).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
Id. at 353.
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (discussing the transition from the trespass approach in
Olmstead to the deviation from the property-based approach in Katz); accord In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information
(Eastern New York Order 2), 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted); see
also Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Privacy in the Government Workplace and City of Ontario,
California v. Quon: The Supreme Court Brought Forth a Mouse, 81 MISS. L.J. 1359, 1384–1405
(2012) (analyzing City of Ontario v. Quon).
533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citations omitted).

12

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

affect most people’s daily lives: a home;56 a vehicle;57 a business prem58
59
60
61
ise; a hotel room; a storage locker; a telephone booth; and
62
mail. With the exception of telephone booths, which practically no
longer exist, and postal mail, which may not exist in the near future,
these examples are all places in which people routinely take and use
63
their cell phones.
This development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, particularly the notion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, influences
how people view privacy, including their cell-site location data. In a
poll that “attempted to assess whether Californians would support
strong judicial intervention before law enforcement accessed historical location data,” people were asked “Would you favor a law that required the police to convince a judge that a crime has been committed before obtaining location information from the cell phone
64
company?” In response, 73% of people supported or strongly sup56

57

58

59

60
61
62

63

64

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”) (citations omitted)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”) (citations omitted)).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“[T]he Government’s installation of a
GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12 (1977) (“[A]utomobiles are ‘effects’ under the Fourth Amendment, and searches and
seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.”).
See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.”); See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence,
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries
upon his private commercial property.”).
See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (“A hotel room can clearly be
the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an office.” (citation
omitted)); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1964) (rejecting the argument that
a search of a hotel room, although conducted without the petitioner’s consent, was lawful
because it was conducted with the consent of the hotel clerk).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 720 n.6 (1984).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“[A] person in a telephone booth may
rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed packages
are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation
of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).
One scholar has posited that “[a]lthough the phrase ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
sounds mystical, in most (though not all) cases, an expectation of privacy becomes ‘reasonable’ only when it is backed by a right to exclude borrowed from real property law.”
Kerr, supra note 50, at 809–10.
Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Research Report: A Supermajority of Californians Supports Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Location Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N 8
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ported this requirement.65 Indeed, numerous groups and entities
across the political spectrum view warrants as a prerequisite to obtaining location data:
Not only civil liberties groups insist that warrants to track the whereabouts of Americans—or at least their cell phones—are necessary. A coalition that formed in March includes Google, Microsoft, AOL, eBay, Intel, Qwest, AT&T, and conservative and libertarian groups including
66
Americans for Tax Reform and the Progress and Freedom Foundation.

Ultimately, most survey participants expect their cell-site location information to be private. This expectation coupled with the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—most notably Katz—
supports the position that Fourth Amendment protections extend to
cell tower dumps.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
ALONG WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY LED CONGRESS TO
ENACT LEGISLATION TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS’ PRIVACY FROM
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
In 1968, in response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Katz and
67
Berger v. New York, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
68
and Safe Streets Act, which amended the law authorizing wiretaps.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
69
Act, which included the Stored Communications Act. The Electron70
ic Communications Privacy Act was designed to “protect against the
71
Furunauthorized interception of electronic communications.”

65

66

67
68
69

70
71

(Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/mobilevoice/53433100005.pdf.
Id. at 8–9; see Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question
of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 744 (2011) (describing how most users view their location data as private information and expect it to remain private).
Declan McCullagh, ACLU: FBI Used ‘Dragnet’-Style Warrantless Cell Tracking, CNET NEWS
(June 22, 2010, 9:37 AM PDT), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20008444-281.html
(citation omitted).
388 U.S. 41, 54–60 (outlining the steps necessary for a wiretap statute to be constitutional).
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). Congress first enacted a statute authorizing wiretaps in 1934. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access, Pub. L.
No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1861 (Oct. 21, 1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2710); see also Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic
Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 607–09 (2007) (discussing the Stored Communications
Act).
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986); Maryland Order 1, 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 571; see also Bankston, supra note 69, at 607 (describing how the new act protected electronic communica-
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thermore, Congress sought to “update and clarify Federal privacy
protections and standards in light of dramatic changes in new com72
puter and telecommunications technologies.” Courts have noted
that the purpose of the Stored Communication Act is to protect and
balance people’s privacy with the government’s law enforcement ac73
tivities.
Despite the statute’s purported attempt to preserve privacy rights,
the Stored Communications Act allows the government to obtain
electronic communications records from providers based on standards less demanding than probable cause:
A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the governmental
entity—
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the
offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of
this section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure;
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement
investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and
place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which
subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing . . . ; or
74
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).

72

73

74

tions as well as wire and oral communications); Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need For Revisions
To The Law Of Wiretapping And Interception Of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
1, 39 (2003) (explaining how the Electronic Communications Privacy Act amended the
federal Wiretap Act in order to protect the privacy of electronic communications).
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1; Maryland Order 1, 849 F. Supp. 2d, at 571; Pikowsky, supra note
71, at 39 (“The[se] statutory amendments established a privacy interest for parties to cellular telephone conversations . . . .”).
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (Keith, J., concurring) (“The
purpose of § 2703, along with the Stored Communications Act as a whole, is to maintain
the boundaries between a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy and crime prevention in light of quickly advancing technology.” (citing S. Rep. 99-541, at 4)); Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Stored Communications Act
protects individuals’ privacy and proprietary interests. The Act reflects Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of communications in
electronic storage as a communications facility.”); Penrose Computer Marketgroup, Inc.
v. Camin, 682 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The purpose of the SCA was, in
part to protect privacy interests in personal and proprietary information and to address
‘the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, and sometimes tampering with, electronic or wire communications that are not intended to be
available to the public.’”)(citations omitted)).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2006).

Oct. 2013]

CELL TOWER DUMPS

15

Subscriber or customer information also available based on a law enforcement request may include the person’s name; address; telephone call records, including times and durations; lengths and types
of services; subscriber number or identity; means and source of payment, including bank account number or credit card number; date
75
of birth; social security number; and driver’s license number. Indeed, any of this information is available simply by presenting the tel76
ecommunications provider with a subpoena.
To obtain records other than those just specified, including cellsite location data, the government must obtain either a warrant or a
court order. In obtaining a court order, a law enforcement officer
must simply present the court with “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga77
tion.”
Some scholars have referred to the D Order standard as a “Terry-stop”
standard, a reference to Terry v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court created
the reasonable suspicion standard for sidewalk stop-and-frisk encounters.
The Terry standard is met when an officer “point[s] to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, evince more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
78
hunch of criminal activity.

As courts have noted, the “specific and articulable facts” standard
creates a lesser burden than the requirement of a warrant based on
probable cause. The Third Circuit has explained that “the [Act’s]
legislative history provides ample support for the proposition that the

75

76

77

78

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); accord In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Va.
2011); see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)
(Southern New York Order 1), 157 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing an order pursuant to § 2703 authorizing the government to receive “the subscriber’s name,
home address, telephone number, e-mail address and any other identifying information
[the provider] may have, such as date of birth, social security number, driver’s license
number and billing information”).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); see also United States v. Orozco, 456 F. App’x 149, 151–52 (3d Cir.
2012) (records obtained by subpoena as opposed to a warrant were admissible); Third Circuit Order, 620 F.3d 304, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the use of subpoena to obtain
records pursuant to § 2703(c)(2)).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (emphases added). Even the United States Department of Justice
acknowledges that “[t]he requirements for obtaining a section 2703(d) court order must
be met even if the government seeks the court order only to obtain subscriber and telephone information.” ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 5, at 18.
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 151–52 (citations omitted); see generally Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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standard is an intermediate one that is less stringent than probable
79
cause.”
In 1979, the Supreme Court established that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he or she
80
dials. In Smith v. Maryland, law enforcement agents used a pen register, which records the outgoing dialed telephone numbers on a
specific telephone. “A ‘pen register’ is a device used, inter alia, to
record the dialing and other information transmitted by a targeted
81
phone.” The counterpart to a pen register is a trap-and-trace device,
which records the incoming dialed telephone numbers on a specific
82
telephone. Nonetheless, the principles outlined in Smith concerning the expectation of privacy in telephone numbers apply equally to
the analysis of applications pursuant to § 2703.
When law enforcement obtains just a suspect’s cell phone number, because no search has been conducted, no Fourth Amendment
83
In Smith, the Supreme Court reasoned that
right is implicated.
79

80

81

82

83

Third Circuit Order, 620 F.3d at 315; see also Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz.,
102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 910 (2004) (explaining how the Stored Communications Act allows law enforcement officers to obtain access to the stored communications from a
communications provider without a warrant so that e-mail content may be accessed with a
showing of less than probable cause).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (rejecting the claims that people have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the numbers they dial on their phones); see also
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Therefore the use of a pen
register is not a Fourth Amendment search. Importantly, the Court [in Smith v. Maryland] distinguished pen registers from more intrusive surveillance techniques on the
ground that ‘pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications’ but rather obtain only the addressing information associated with phone calls.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1319 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (“‘[I]nstallation
and use of a pen register . . . [is] not a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and therefore its use does not violate the Constitution.’” (quoting Smith, 442
U.S. at 745–46); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing how Smith v. Maryland established that a device which merely records the numbers dialed from a particular telephone line does not represent a sufficient invasion of
privacy to warrant Fourth Amendment protection); United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d
399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1987)
(same).
United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010); accord In re Application of U.S.
for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers (Maryland Order 2), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602 (D.
Md. 2005)(“[P]en register records telephone numbers dialed for outgoing calls from the
target phone . . . .”).
Maryland Order 2, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (“[A] trap/trace device . . . records the telephone numbers of those calling the target phone”); Southern Texas Order 1, 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“A trap and trace device captures the numbers of calls
made to the target phone.”).
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (explaining that if “no invasion of a
legitimate expectation of privacy” occurs, then “no ‘search’ within the meaning of the
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“[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers
to the telephone company,” and they all understand “that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers
84
they dial.” Because the reasoning in Smith applies equally to cell
phone users, they likewise have no reasonable expectation of privacy
85
in their own phone numbers.
However, unlike in Smith, in seeking a cell tower dump, the government routinely requests more information than just the telephone
86
numbers dialed. Often, the goal beyond developing a list of suspects in a criminal investigation is to track the location and movement of those suspects. Because the information sought pursuant to
§ 2703 exceeds just telephone numbers, Smith is inapplicable to the
government’s requests for a cell tower dump.
IV. RECORDS FROM BOTH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS INDICATE THAT CELL TOWER
DUMPS ROUTINELY OCCUR
Cell tower dumps have not garnered much attention in the media.
Indeed, the government does not like to draw attention to this elec-

84

85

86

Fourth Amendment” does either); see also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[B]y subscribing to the telephone service the user of the phone is
deemed to surrender any privacy interest he may have had in his phone number.” (citing
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43)); United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 666 (4th Cir. 2011)
(“Phone customers have no constitutionally cognizable privacy interests in basic subscriber information.”) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–46)); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[A] person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in numerical information he conveys to a telephone company in the ordinary course of business.”
(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44)).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; accord United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md.
2012) (quoting Smith); United States v. Benford, No 2:09CR86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (same); see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555,
1557 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing Smith and rejecting any expectation of privacy where
the phone numbers dialed by telephone users are transmitted through the telephone
company, which also keeps records and provides bills with lists of telephone numbers dialed).
See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Telephone
Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–
45).
See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, at 162 (demonstrating how extensive court orders for telephone electronic communication records can be); see also Southern New York Order 1, 157 F. Supp. 2d 268, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(“The Order requires Cablevision to provide the Government with the subscriber’s name, home address,
telephone number, e-mail address and any other identifying information Cablevision may
have, such as date of birth, social security number, driver’s license number and billing information.”).
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tronic surveillance method. Interestingly, in my own informal survey
of magistrate judges nationwide, many have informed me that they
were unfamiliar with cell tower dumps. After coming to an understanding of the procedure, numerous had concerns or reservations
about them.
In August 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union sought records regarding electronic surveillance, including cell tower dumps,
87
from numerous law enforcement agencies around the country.
Specifically, “35 ACLU affiliates filed over 380 public records requests
with state and local law enforcement agencies to ask about their poli88
cies, procedures and practices for tracking cell phones.” Ultimately,
it “received over 5,500 pages of documents from over 200 local law
89
enforcement agencies regarding cell phone tracking.” The ACLU
90
has made publicly available records it received from these requests.
It obtained these documents through public records requests from
91
various law enforcement officials.
Moreover, the production of cell-site location information has resulted in significant breaches of innocent third parties’ privacy rights.
In United States v. Capito, the government obtained records from cell
towers near four separate bank robbery crime scenes in rural Arizo92
na. After obtaining responses to their requests from the various telecommunications providers, the FBI agents ultimately received over
93
150,000 telephone numbers. In a Connecticut federal case, the cell
tower dump revealed 180 different individuals’ cell numbers, includ94
ing the defendant who was ultimately convicted of bank robbery.
87

88
89
90
91
92
93

94

Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU (Mar. 25, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-location-trackingpublic-records-request.
Id. In April 2012, an additional affiliate filed 27 requests. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Criminal Complaint at 16, United States v. Capito (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2010)(No. 3:10-CR8050).
Id. at 13. In a Canadian case, R. v. Mahmood, the warrants for the cell tower dumps covered only four cellular providers in a neighborhood in the greater Toronto metropolitan
area. 2008 CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. 3d 3, 79 W.C.B. 2d
366, at ¶¶ 19, 96. Those requesting officers received records concerning 9,588 separate
telephone calls by 7,067 different customers. Moreover, it revealed personal information
regarding the telephone companies’ subscribers, including the subscribers’ names and
addresses, information regarding their approximate geographic location on the date and
at the time in question (that is, in the vicinity of the two cellular transmission towers), information regarding what telephone numbers they were calling and/or what numbers
were calling them, and information regarding the duration of their calls. Id. at ¶ 19.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at 7, United States v. Soto, (D. Conn.
May 18, 2010) (No. 3:09-CR-200-AWT).

Oct. 2013]

CELL TOWER DUMPS

19

A. Cellular Service Providers Routinely Provide Cell Tower Dump Records to
Law Enforcement Officials
The records obtained by the ACLU establish that various cellular
telephone and Internet providers charge fees to provide law enforcement officers with information from a search of their subscrib95
ers’ accounts. For some providers, cell phone surveillance, includ96
ing cell tower dumps, generates revenue. For example, in 2011,
Verizon “report[ed] that it had been ‘reimbursed approximately
three to five million dollars in each of the last five years’ for the data”
97
it provided to law enforcement. Similarly, AT&T collected $8.3 mil98
lion in fees, up from $2.8 million in 2007. Although Sprint declined
to provide any information about how much it collects in fees, commentators have estimated that it could be as high as $26 million, but
99
probably at least $10 million. Even U.S. Cellular, a small provider,
reported earning $460,000 in fees from providing data in response to
95

96

97

98

99

See 18 U.S.C. § 2706 (2006)(addressing cost reimbursement); see also Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 693 F. Supp. 542, 544 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (“While not a model
of legislative drafting, it is clear that Congress did not intend that service providers be
compensated for costs of compliance for routine requests for toll or subscriber information. As a general rule, the government must pay service providers ‘a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise providing such
information’ . . . .” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a))). Moreover, those cell phone numbers
are now available to anyone online. See McCullagh, supra note 66.
See Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as Routine Tool: Cell Companies Profit: Civil
Libertarians Worry as Surveillance Skirts Court Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at A1 (“The
practice has become big business for cellphone companies, too, with a handful of carriers
marketing a catalog of ‘surveillance fees’ to police departments to determine a suspect’s
location, trace phone calls and texts or provide other services.”); Clarence Walker, Warrantless Cell Phone Tapping? How Police May Be Secretly Tracking You, ALTERNET (May 25,
2012), available at http://www.alternet.org/drugs/155604/warrantless_cell_phone_
tapping_how_police_may_be_secretly_tracking_you (“Not only are the wireless providers
profiting from your privacy by working with the police, they are lobbying to be able to
continue to do so.”); Lee, supra note 5 (“The documents also suggest that selling customer information to law enforcement has become a significant revenue source for cell
phone companies.”). But see Andy Greenberg, These Are the Prices AT&T, Verizon and
Sprint Charge for Cellphone Wiretaps, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/04/03/these-are-the-prices-attverizon-and-sprint-charge-for-cellphone-wiretaps/ (quoting Verizon representing that it
does not “make a profit from any of the data requests from law enforcement”).
David Sydiongco & Will Oremus, How Much Money Does Your Cellphone Company Make from
Selling Your Data to Police?, SLATE (July 19, 2012) (footnote omitted),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/19/cellphone_spying_wireless_carri
ers_make_millions_tracking_customers_selling_data_to_police.html.
Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-toaid-surveillance.html.
Id.

20

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

law enforcement requests.100 This interest in increasing revenue creates an incentive to cooperate with law enforcement that invariably
101
leads to a loss of privacy by some innocent third parties.
Each cellular telephone service provider has set fees for cell tower
dumps. AT&T Mobility charges $50 per hour with a four-hour mini102
It recommends
mum for what it characterizes as “Tower Dumps.”
“marking the service of the search warrant or court order URGENT”
103
U.S. Cellular bills $50
in order to receive an expedited response.
for each staff hour for each cell tower dump when the requests re104
For what are dequire more than thirty minutes of staff time.
scribed as “Cell Tower Searches,” T-Mobile charges $100 per tower
for each hour with the fee rounded up to the next hour for just a list
of telephone numbers, but $150 per tower for each hour where the
105
subscriber information is provided with each telephone number.
Verizon charges $30 per hour for “Cell site searches” conducted by
the Legal Department systems and $60 per hour for each targeted
106
Verizon
tower if the search is done by the Network Department.
does not charge any additional fee for providing subscriber infor107
mation related to the tower dump request. Sprint/Nextel charges
$50 a search for each tower and will also provide the subscriber with
108
Indeed, records received by
the telephone numbers if requested.
the ACLU provide an example in which the police department in
109
Cary, North Carolina paid Sprint $500 for tower searches. Typically, it provides this information in three to five days, but can provide it
110
Alltel Comthrough expedited service for an additional charge.
munication Wireless charges a flat fee of $500 for each tower
111
search.

100
101
102

103
104
105
106
107
108
109

110
111

Id.
Some carriers note that they lose money responding to these requests and that they are
often not paid the fees on their submitted invoices. See Lichtblau, supra note 97.
Letter from Lisa A. Judge to Dan Pochoda at 87 (Sept. 6, 2011), ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_tucsonpd_
tucsonaz.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 88, 106.
Id. at 88, 115.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Letter from Michael Williams to Katherine Lewis Parker at 504 (Sept. 22, 2011), ACLU,
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_
carypd_carync. pdf.
Letter from Lisa A. Judge to Dan Pochoda, supra note 102, at 89.
Id. at 87.

Oct. 2013]

CELL TOWER DUMPS

21

According to an August 2010 chart prepared by the Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Department of Justice,
each telecommunications provider has different retention periods
112
Thus, Verizon keeps
regarding the cell towers used by phones.
such information for about a year, Sprint/Nextel keeps it for at least
eighteen months and up to two years, and AT&T has been keeping
113
such records since July 2008. Even though T-Mobile represents that
it maintains cell tower records for no longer than six months, the
Department of Justice indicated that such retention was likely more
114
than a year. In other words, these records are kept for long periods
of time and the likelihood is that those periods of time will increase
indefinitely such that the records will unlikely be destroyed. Most
providers will probably follow AT&T’s example of keeping the records indefinitely going forward.
115
One cell phone provider, Cricket Wireless, does “not do cell site
116
or tower dumps, nor do they call this type of request anything else.”
Instead, it requires a phone number or name in order to provide in117
formation. On the other end of the spectrum, AT&T Mobility even
provided suggestions regarding specific language to use in any such
request: “(electronic) Cell Tower Dump information for any and all
cell phones that were used during (date and time frame) for the tow118
It provides this
ers that cover this area (address information).”
guidance notwithstanding a company privacy policy representing that
it does not sell its subscribers’ information: “We will not sell your
119
Of
personal information to anyone, for any purpose. Period.”
course, the records obtained by the ACLU flatly contradicted AT&T’s
assertion. In the end, AT&T sells its customers’ information—
112

113
114
115

116
117
118
119

Retention Periods of Major Cellular Service Providers (U.S. Dep’t of Justice), ACLU
(Aug. 2010), http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cellphone-company-data-retention-chart; David Kravets, Which Telecoms Store Your Data the
Longest?
Secret Memo Tells All, WIRED.COM (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/cellular-customer-data/.
Retention Periods of Major Cellular Service Providers, supra note 112.
Id.
Unlike most cell phone providers with nationwide coverage, Cricket Wireless does not
require a signed contract and utilizes prepaid plans. CRICKET WIRELESS,
http://www.mycricket.com (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
Letter from Lisa A. Judge to Dan Pochoda, supra note 102, at 89.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Privacy Policy, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/privacy-policy?pid=2506 (last visited Aug.
9, 2013). Other providers acknowledge using subscribers’ personal information. For example, T-Mobile explains that it “use[s] personal information for a variety of business
purposes.” Privacy Policy: Highlights, T-Mobile, http://www.t-mobile.com/company/
website/privacypolicy.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
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collecting $8.3 million in 2011—against its policy and more importantly, against the best interest of its customers. AT&T and other
providers have capitalized on the sale of this customer information
potentially at the expense of individual Fourth Amendment rights.
B. The Federal Government Routinely Utilizes Cell Tower Dump Records
During Its Criminal Investigations
The wireless service providers’ creation of master fee lists simply
reflects law enforcement’s growing interest in various types of surveillance as well as the providers’ willingness to capitalize on such interest to generate additional income. Indeed, the United States Department of Justice has advised federal law enforcement officials that,
generally, obtaining “[a] Court Order for a ‘tower Dump’ could pro120
vide valuable leads” in a criminal investigation. It further explains
that a cell tower dump is “[h]elpful when the location and time
frame have been narrowed down, but the target’s phone number is un121
known.” However, this guide does not provide law enforcement officials with the basis for seeking a court order for this information or
address the applicable legal standards. Moreover, it does not explain
how the investigator is to discern the target phone number from all
of the telephone numbers received.
Another Department of Justice internal publication, the Electronic
Surveillance Manual, “sets forth the procedures established by the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to obtain authorization to conduct electronic surveillance,” including cell tower
122
dumps. The Manual provides the Department’s attorneys with not
only guidance, but form orders and form applications to use when
seeking court orders and warrants to obtain electronic surveillance.
Regarding court orders pursuant to § 2703(d), the Manual specifically directs the Assistant United States Attorney to first
appl[y] to the court for an order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), directing (provider of electronic communication service . . . ) to disclose the
(choose as appropriate: name; address; local and long distance telephone
connection records, or records of session times and durations; length of
service [including start date] and types of service utilized; telephone or
instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including

120
121
122

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT TELEPHONE INVESTIGATIONS RESOURCE GUIDE
7 (rev. Mar. 10, 2010), available at http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/le-tel-spy.pdf.
Id. (emphasis added).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, at ii.
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any temporarily assigned network address; means and source of payment
123
for such service.

Next, the attorney should certify “that it is believed that the subjects
of the investigation are using the (choose as appropriate: telephone or
instrument number; other subscriber number or identity . . . ) in furtherance of the subject offenses; and that the information sought is
124
In
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
other words, within such a certification, the Department of Justice
acknowledges that some specific identifier, such as a telephone number or the subscriber’s name, is necessary to obtain a court order pursuant to § 2703(d). This acknowledgment is significant because a cell
tower dump requests large amounts of subscriber information without providing any specific identifier to obtain that information. In
order to obtain records, including cell site location information, pursuant to § 2703, law enforcement officers must provide a specific
125
phone number.
V. THE FEW COURTS TO HAVE ADDRESSED CELL TOWER DUMPS HAVE
IGNORED BOTH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVACY RIGHTS
OF THOSE NOT TARGETED
The few existing judicial decisions addressing cell tower dumps establish that they can be a valuable weapon in law enforcement’s arsenal. Moreover, the facts of these various cases demonstrate the types
of criminal investigations in which officers have sought to utilize cell
tower dumps. However, these decisions do not analyze the standard
by which courts should authorize cell tower dumps. They also generally do not address Fourth Amendment concerns and seemingly never address the privacy issues related to individuals who are not the
subject of the criminal investigation.

123
124

125

Id. at 162.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, another manual focusing on computer evidence, provides a proposed application for obtaining information pursuant to § 2703(d) utilizing a
specific e-mail account. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 214 (2009),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
See In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), _
F. Supp. 2d _, 2013 WL 1934491, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2013) (noting that the Assistant
United States Attorney acknowledged that the application failed to provide any specific
identifier as mandated by the Department of Justice's own guidance); see also In re U.S.
For an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F.
Supp. 2d 947, 952 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (stating that the Stored Communications Act provides
records of specific subscribers or customers) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)).

24

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

A. State Court in Georgia: Jackson v. State
In Jackson v. State, a jury convicted the appellant of several counts
of burglary, false imprisonment, kidnapping, armed robbery, and ag126
The
gravated assault as well as the murder of one of the victims.
appellant and other accomplices had engaged in home invasions,
127
where they robbed and assaulted their victims. A third person had
served as their driver, taking them to the robbery sites and then driv128
During one robbery, the victims were being
ing the getaway car.
driven to their jewelry store when one of them noticed they were fol129
lowing another car that happened to be the getaway car.
Regarding the cell tower dump, the court simply explained that
“[d]uring the course of their investigation, police obtained cell
phone numbers from a cell tower ‘dump’ from the tower nearest to
130
The
the residences of the home invasions and the jewelry store.”
cell phone number for both the appellant and the getaway driver
131
were among the numbers retrieved.
On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial evidence was insufficient because it merely consisted of the getaway driver’s uncorrobo132
rated testimony. Regarding the evidence from the cell tower dump,
he merely asserted “that the cell phone records are also not sufficient
corroborating evidence as they only establish where his cell phone
was at the time of the crimes, and not where he was, since he may
133
It does not appear that the
have let a friend borrow his phone.”
appellant directly challenged the constitutionality of the cell tower
dump itself. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Supreme
Court of Georgia concluded that the cell phone records, while cir-

126
127
128
129
130
131

132
133

716 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. 2011).
Id. at 189–90.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. One commentator has noted that the Jackson case is the only state court decision
mentioning tower dumps. Brown, supra note 3. Indeed, there is scant information available regarding the use of tower dumps by state law enforcement officials. However, in
one recent case, two individuals were arrested for a series of burglaries throughout New
England in which a cell tower dump was used to connect them to some of the crime
scenes. See Karin Crompton, Police Footwork Tracked Down Burglary Suspects, THE DAY
(Conn.) (updated Dec. 18, 2010, 1:49 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/
20101218/NWS04/312189908.
Jackson, 716 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 191; accord Brown, supra note 3 (noting that “proper process was not an issue in that
case”).
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cumstantial, were nonetheless sufficiently independent to constitute
134
corroborating testimony.
B. Federal Court in Texas: United States v. Duffey
In United States v. Duffey, the Northern District of Texas addressed
a cell tower dump concerning an FBI investigation of “a group of
armed robbers dubbed the ‘Scarecrow Bandits’ that [sic] had violent135
ly robbed more than twenty banks in the Dallas area.” During this
investigation, the FBI utilized a cell tower dump to obtain cell phone
records for the times and area around numerous bank robberies by
136
Specifically, these records established that
the Scarecrow Bandits.
the cell phones of two defendants were used near cell towers around
the time of each of the robberies and that other Scarecrow Bandits’
cell phones were linked to both these two defendants and cell towers
137
near the banks.
The cell phone records, as well as other information that the FBI
obtained during its initial investigation, were used in turn to obtain
138
The defendants filed motions seeking to suppress the
wiretaps.
139
wiretaps. Again, as in Jackson, in denying these motions, the court
did not directly address any Fourth Amendment concerns about the
cell tower dump. The federal prosecutors involved in the Scarecrow
Bandits case maintain “that this was the first and the only time that
the FBI has used the location-data-mining technique to nab bank

134
135
136

137

138
139

Jackson, 716 S.E.2d at 191.
No. 3:08-CR-0167-B 2009 WL 2356156, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2009); see also Pell &
Soghoian, supra note 8, at 119 (discussing this series of robberies).
Brian Owsley, Cops and Robbers: The Use of Cell Tower Dumps to Investigate Bank Robberies,
American Criminal Law Review (Jan. 26, 2013, 16:40), http://www.
americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/cops-and-robbers-use-celltower-dumps-investigate-bank-robberies-01-26-2013-0. In a similar type of case involving a
bank robbery, a “magistrate judge approved the request: ‘The FBI was trying to find a
bank robber. The robbery was [in a specific state], and they were pretty sure the robber
and accomplices were from [a specific city]. They knew he had a cell phone. They asked
for tower dumps to try to locate only phones with a [specific] area code which were in the
immediate vicinity at the time of the robbery.’” Id.
Duffey, 2009 WL 2356156 at *1; see also Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell
Phones, CNET (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:00 AM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_310451518-38.html (“FBI agents obtained logs from mobile phone companies
corresponding to what their cellular towers had recorded at the time of a dozen different
bank robberies in the Dallas area. The voluminous records showed that two phones had
made calls around the time of all 12 heists, and that those phones belong to
men . . . [who were] eventually convicted . . . of multiple bank robbery and weapons
charges.”).
Duffey, 2009 WL 2356156 at *2.
Id.
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robbers.”140 Of course, just because cell tower dumps are rare does
not mean that the manner in which this one was done passes constitutional muster.
C. Federal Court in Texas: Applications for Cell Tower Dumps
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application on behalf of the United States of America for a court order of disclosure of
141
telecommunications records in July 2011. “That application sought
to require AT&T, Cricket, Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon
Wireless to provide the FBI with cell phone records for four specific
142
“Each location was identified by the address of a bank
locations.”
143
with a specific date and a fifteen minute interval.” “The [A]ssistant
United States Attorney certified that the FBI was investigating multiple bank robberies and made the request pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
144
§ 2703(c) and (d).” Ultimately, a court order was never granted regarding this application because the Assistant United States Attorney
withdrew the application instead of responding to the magistrate
judge’s questions regarding the appropriate standard for the elec145
tronic surveillance request.
In a series of three nearly identical applications filed also in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the
Assistant United States Attorney sought the disclosure of cell tower
records pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) and (d) from AT&T,
Sprint/Nextel, and Verizon Wireless respectively in December 2011.
Each application provided specific coordinates for two locations
146
along with a date and a time period for those locations. Both state
and federal law enforcement agencies carried out the investigation
regarding two individuals allegedly involved in the trafficking of narcotics. There were also allegations of a robbery by these two individuals. Although the Government had cell phone numbers associated
with both individuals charged with drug smuggling, the applicant
140
141

142
143
144
145
146

McCullagh, supra note 137.
Brian L. Owsley, Cops and Robbers: The Use of Cell Tower Dumps to Investigate Bank Robberies,
CRIM.
L.
REV.
(2013),
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/
A.
Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/cops-and-robbers-use-cell-tower-dumps-investigate-bankrobberies-01-26-2013.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“Indeed, the application was withdrawn and the case number reassigned to another
action.”).
A copy of each of these three applications is on file with the author.
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sought the cell tower records to “help clarify the locations and indi147
Ultimately, because the
viduals possibly involved” in the robbery.
Government was unable to provide the court with support for the position that such records should be released without establishing probable cause, the court never granted the order regarding the request
for all cell tower records. Instead, an order regarding the release of
records associated with the two known cell numbers was issued pursuant to § 2703.
D. Federal Court in Arizona: United States v. Capito
On March 12, 2010, the United States Attorney for the District of
Arizona charged Ronald Capito and Joel Glore with eight counts of
148
The High Country Bandits, as they were known,
bank robbery.
conducted a number of bank robberies in rural areas throughout the
state. Based on a number of similarities among these robberies, the
FBI agent leading the investigation obtained a court order from a
federal magistrate judge “for records of all mobile telephones that
registered with cell towers closest to four of the more remote robbery
149
Based on this cell tower
locations on the dates of the robberies.”
dump, the investigating agents received over 150,000 telephone
150
numbers. They believed, however
that due to the vast difference in distance and time between the cell towers and the dates of the robberies . . . that it would be extremely unusual
for a cell phone number to appear on two or more of the cell phone
151
towers servicing the area of the bank on the exact robbery dates.

A computer analysis of these 150,000 telephone numbers revealed a
single telephone number that definitively appeared at three of the
152
Further analysis revealed that this
towers near the robbed banks.
cell phone made contact with another cell phone immediately before
two of the robberies, and more importantly, that the second cell
phone was also near two of the cell towers around the time of the
153
After the application of a § 2703(d) order, it was
bank robberies.
determined that this first cell phone belonged to defendant Ronald
147
148
149
150

151
152
153

Id. at 7.
Criminal Complaint, United States v. Capito at 2–3, 35 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2010) (No. 3:10CR-8050).
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13. Some of those numbers were attached as exhibits to court documents. It is unclear what, if anything, the Government has done with the vast majority of the information received regarding the 150,000 numbers.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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Capito and that the second cell phone belonged to defendant Joel
154
Glore.
In response to the electronic surveillance, Capito filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the court order authorizing the
cell tower dump, most notably, his identification and location among
155
He argued that the investigating
the 150,000 cell phone records.
agent used the § 2703(d) order because he was unable to establish
156
probable cause. He argued that the scale of the disclosure based on
a dragnet search of every phone within the relatively close proximity
of each of the four crime sites extended beyond the scope of an or157
der addressing the historical cell-site information of one phone.
In response, the Government maintained that a § 2703(d) order is
158
the appropriate basis for obtaining historical cell site information.
Next, it argued that even if the order was improper, there was no
159
Even if the defendant’s cell phone
statutory suppression remedy.
were deemed to be a tracking device, a warrant was unnecessary, and
160
a suppression remedy was still unavailable. Finally, the Government
asserted that the defendant does not have any suppression remedy
161
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
At a hearing regarding the motion to suppress, the defendant denied arguing that cell tower information can never be obtained and
162
used, but argued instead that there must simply be probable cause.
The district judge suggested that “[t]here is very good reason to think
that these were similar perpetrators because of the identical modus
operandi. There was the geographic proximity and more than a
163
hunch that cell phones were being used.” When the defense attorney asserted that Capito’s phone “is a cell phone that’s tracking loca154
155
156
157
158
159

160
161
162
163

Id. at 15.
Motion to Suppress, United States v. Capito, (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2010) (No. 3:10-CR-8050).
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 14.
Gov’t Response to Motion to Suppress at 6–10, United States v. Capito, (D. Ariz. Feb. 7,
2011) (No. 3:10-CR-8050).
Id. at 10–13. Although the court cites to 18 U.S.C. § 3117 addressing tracking devices, id.,
the Stored Communications Act explicitly bars any suppression remedies. See 18 U.S.C. §
2708 (“The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”); see also United States
v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Even if Defendant was correct that the
Government did not comply with the SCA, the statute does not provide for a suppression
remedy.”) (citations omitted).
Id. at 10–14.
Id. at 14–15.
Transcript of Hearing at 18, United States v. Capito (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (No. 3:10CR-8050).
Id. at 19.
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tion,” the judge responded that “[i]t’s a cell phone that’s transmitting
its location by the action and choice of everybody who has a cell
164
phone.” Ultimately, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress,
concluding that the § 2703(d) standard was met, but he did not ex165
plain this position beyond his conclusion.
E. Federal Court in Connecticut: United States v. Soto
The United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut indicted Luis Soto and his brother, Felix Soto, for a series of bank robberies. A federal magistrate judge had issued an order pursuant to
§ 2703(d) requiring cell phone companies to provide information,
including cell site location data. Ultimately, federal investigators obtained 180 different telephone numbers, for which telephone service
providers had to give to agents “all cell site tracking data and cell site
locator information for all incoming and outgoing calls to and from
166
the Target Numbers.”
In a motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the order authorizing the release of this information was done without demonstrating probable cause and that the Government should have ob167
tained a warrant in order to secure this information. In response,
the Government argued that the Stored Communications Act does
168
not provide a remedy based on suppression. It further asserted that
historical cell site information does not impact a privacy interest pur169
suant to the Fourth Amendment.

164
165
166

167

168

169

Id. at 23.
Id. at 35.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress at 1, United States v. Soto, (D. Conn.
May 18, 2010) (No. 3:09-CR-200). Indeed, at a minimum, all 180 telephone numbers
were made publicly available. Id. at Ex. B; see also McCullagh, supra note 66 (providing a
link to a list of the phone numbers tracked).
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, United States v. Soto, (D. Conn. May
18, 2010) (No. 3:09-CR-200); see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 120 (discussing how
the government obtained and used historical cell tower logs).
Government’s Response To Defendant’s Motion To Preclude Cell Phone Evidence at 9–
10, United States v. Soto, (D. Conn. June 28, 2010) (No. 3:09-CR-200); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2708 (2006)(“The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial
remedies and sanctions for no constitutional violations of this chapter.”). Various courts
have determined that suppression of evidence is not a remedy available pursuant to the
Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“[V]iolations of the ECPA do not warrant exclusion of evidence.”); United
States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Stored Communications Act
does not provide an exclusion remedy.”).
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Preclude Cell Phone Evidence at 13–
21, United States v. Soto, (D. Conn. June 28, 2010) (No. 3:09-CR-200).
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In a one-page order, the district judge denied the motion to suppress:
The basic premise of the defendant’s motion is that the government did
not obtain cell site location information by means of a warrant based upon a showing of good cause. This issue is addressed extensively in In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.
2010), where the court rejected the position being advocated by the de170
fendant, and the court finds the analysis persuasive.

The Third Circuit decision upon which the district judge relied does
not address the suppression of evidence for any purported violations
of the Stored Communications Act. Similarly, it does not cite to
§ 2708. Instead, that court held “that CSLI [Cell Site Location Information] from cell phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable
171
cause determination.” However, a magistrate judge (and presumably a district judge) has “the option to require a warrant showing
172
probable cause” rather than the lesser standard.
At trial in Soto,
[t]he government presented the testimony of an expert in cellular site
technology who used these cell site records to produce maps and charts
showing that the participants in the robbery called one another extensively around the time of the robbery, while utilizing cellular towers with173
in a short distance from [the bank].

Ultimately, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy
term of incarceration.
F. Canadian Court in Ontario: Regina v. Mahmood
In Regina v. Mahmood, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed a number of surveillance issues stemming from several warrants, including cell tower dumps. On November 17, 2006, in
Brampton, Ontario, a suburb of Toronto, three men robbed a jewelry
174
store of about $35,000 in cash and $500,000 in jewelry. Initially, two
170
171
172
173

174

Order re Motion To Suppress Cell Site Location Information, United States v. Soto, (D.
Conn. April 13, 2011) (No. 3:09-CR-200).
Third Circuit Order, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 319.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Connecticut, Federal Jury Finds Suffield
Man Guilty of Robbing Berlin Bank (May 6, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/ct/Press2011/20110506-2.html.
R. v. Mahmood, 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. 3d 3, 79 W.C.B. 2d 366 at ¶ 1, (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J. 2008), aff’d 2011 CanLII 693 (Can. Ont. C.A. 2011); see also QMI Agency, ‘Burka’ Bandit Denied Bail, TORONTO SUN (Apr. 15, 2012, 5:27 PM, updated Apr. 15, 2012, 5:33
PM ), http://www.torontosun.com/2012/04/15/burka-bandit-denied-bail.
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men were buzzed into the store, one of them wearing a burqa as if he
175
were the wife of the other man. They then held the store owner at
gunpoint and let in the third robber after applying duct tape to the
176
store owner’s eyes, mouth, and hands.
With the exception of a plastic shopping bag from an Islamic fashion clothing store, the police had no evidence or leads to any suspects, but they suspected that the robbers used cell phones to perpe177
trate the heist. Accordingly, police officers obtained several search
warrants, including one for a Tower Records Dump for four different
178
telecommunications providers. On November 30, 2006, an officer
swore “that ‘as a robbery investigator with the Central Robbery Bureau’, he was ‘aware that cellular cell telephones are commonly being
used as a means of communications by culprits committing robberies,’ and that tower dumps had been helpful to the police in the
179
This warrant “required that [these providers] produce all
past.”
records of all cellular phone traffic that had passed through two cellular towers located in the vicinity of the crime for the hour and a
180
That warrant ultimately yielded
half that preceded the robbery.”
more than 7,000 different cell phone subscribers, including two of
181
the defendants in the robbery. Based on this information, investigators obtained several more warrants.
Before the trial court, the defendants argued that the Tower
Dump Warrants violated their rights pursuant to the Canadian Char182
Specifically, they asserted that their
ter of Rights and Freedoms.
right to privacy had been violated. The court concluded that the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone
183
records. The court was deeply troubled by these warrants:

175
176
177
178
179
180

181
182

183

QMI Agency, supra note 174.
Mahmood, 2008 CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 3, 79 W.C.B.
2d 366 at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 10, 12.
Id. at ¶ 2–3.
Id. at ¶ 92.
Id. at ¶ 3; see also id. at ¶ 14 (“They wanted all records for all cellular telephone traffic that
had passed through those transmission towers, owned by Rogers Wireless, Fido, Bell Mobility and Telemobile, for November 17, 2006 between 10:20 a.m. and 11:50 a.m., just
prior to the robbery.”).
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 40; see also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms], § 8 (“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”).
See Mahmood, CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. 3d 3, 79 W.C.B. 2d
366 at ¶¶ 55–82; see generally Teresa Scassa, Information Privacy in Public Space: Location Da-
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Most importantly here, the police did not obtain such information under
the Tower Dump Warrants for known or named individuals or known or
named cell phone numbers. They had no knowledge of any particular
person who may have used a cell phone in that vicinity on that day, and
did not channel their search or focus it on any individual persons until
they obtained the second warrant for the Subscriber Records for several
of these four Applicants. It is disingenuous to suggest that the initial
Tower Dump Warrants were any more than a high-tech “fishing expedition” of the broadest order made in the hope that some information
would be obtained that would permit the police investigation to move
184
forward.

Regarding these warrants, it concluded that the lack of focus regarding the search was objectively unreasonable because the investigators
received access to the records of more than 7000 persons merely because an officer swore that in his experience, cell phones are fre185
quently used in robberies.
Next, the court concluded that the police did not have reasonable
186
or probable grounds to obtain these warrants. The court characterized the Tower Dump Warrants as an impermissible fishing expedi187
Ultimately, the trial judge determined that the warrants viotion.
188
lated the rights of thousands of people, including the defendants.
Next, he considered whether the evidence obtained from this warrant
189
Ultimately, he concluded
was admissible at the defendants’ trial.
that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required the exclusion of the evidence “to clearly and unequivocally convey to police
authorities that Canadian citizens have the constitutional right to be
left alone from this kind of unwarranted and unfocused state intru190
sion into their daily lives.”
Notwithstanding the exclusion of evidence from the Tower Dump
Warrants, a jury convicted the defendants of several offenses related

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

ta, Data Protection and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 7 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 193 (2010)
(discussing Mahmood and the privacy concerns raised by the police investigation).
Mahmood, 2008 CanLII 51774 (ON SC), 2008 O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 3, 79 W.C.B.
2d 366 at ¶ 72.
Id. at ¶ 78.
See id. at ¶¶ 83–100.
Id. at ¶¶ 85, 94.
Id. at ¶ 95.
See id. at ¶¶ 103–22.
Id. at ¶ 121; see also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 24(2) (“Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner
that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence
shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”).

Oct. 2013]

CELL TOWER DUMPS

33

to the robbery.191 The Court of Appeals for Ontario affirmed the
192
convictions.
VI. CELL TOWER DUMPS SHOULD NOT BE ANALYZED OR GRANTED
PURSUANT TO § 2703
As various courts have addressed, improving technology enables
the recipients of cell site location information to pinpoint a cell
193
phone within about one hundred feet or less. At the end of 1986,
the year Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
194
Act, there were only 1531 cell sites throughout the United States.
At the end of 2011, there were 283,385 cell sites throughout the
195
United States, up from 127,540 at the end of 2001. As the number
of cell towers increases, the accuracy of the tracking of a specific cell
196
phone (and the cell phone’s user) vastly improves. This enhanced
tracking accuracy is further improved by the increased use of
197
femtocells and picocells. Similarly, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court noted that “[b]y means of signals from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100
feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Gov198
ernment computer.”
191
192
193

194

195
196

197
198

R. v. Mahmood, 2011 CanLII 693 at ¶ 4 (Can. Ont. C.A., 2011).
See generally id.
Eastern New York Order 2, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 590 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“As of February
2008, CSI from multiple towers could reveal the location of a cell phone to within approximately 50 feet, and information from a single tower to within a few hundred feet.”
(citing In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2008)); Southern Texas Order 2, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“By correlating the precise
time and angle at which a phone’s signal arrives at multiple sector base stations, a provider can pinpoint the phone’s latitude and longitude to an accuracy within 50 meters or
less. Emerging versions of the technology are even more precise.” (citation omitted));
Western Texas Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (“Estimates from three
years ago [2007] were that over 90% of cell phones then in use had GPS capabilities,
through which the target phone could be located to within as little as 50 feet.” (citation
omitted)); see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 127 (“[T]he proximity of one cell site
to another in a geographic area is one factor in the production of more accurate location
data.”).
CTIA-The Wireless Association, Annualized Wireless Industry Survey Results—December
1985 to December 2011 (2012), http://www.files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Year_
End_2011_Graphics.pdf.
Id.
See In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers, 402 F.
Supp. 2d 597, 599 n.4 (D. Md. 2005).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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A. The Decision in United States v. Jones Foreshadows a New Heightened
Awareness of the Fourth Amendment Implications for Twenty-First-Century
Surveillance Technology
In United States v. Maynard, during a narcotics trafficking investigation, the government employed various methods of surveillance, including installing a GPS device on the defendant Antoine Jones’s ve199
hicle, which in part led to his conviction. That GPS device tracked
Jones’s “movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved among
scores of places, thereby discovering the totality and pattern of his
200
movements from place to place to place.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that by tracking the defendant Jones’s movements everywhere
for a month, the warrantless GPS application to Jones’s car constituted a search because it defeated his reasonable expectations of priva201
cy. In so doing, the court expressed grave concerns about the inva202
sive nature of the GPS surveillance.
203
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court further elaborated
that the government received a warrant from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that authorized the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle provided that it was installed in
204
the District of Columbia within ten days of the court order. However, the agents installed the GPS tracking device in Maryland one
205
day after the order authorizing it expired. As a result of this surveillance, “the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100
feet, and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Government computer. It relayed more than 2000 pages of data over the
206
4-week period.”

199
200

201

202
203
204
205
206

615 F.3d 544, 549, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment
Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012)
(addressing the application in Maynard of the mosaic theory as “controversial because it
suggests that some limited degree of warrantless GPS tracking would be constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment, but too much is not”).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555–66; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y.
2009) (“What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity is
a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few—and of the pattern
of our professional and avocational pursuits.”).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id.
Id.

Oct. 2013]

CELL TOWER DUMPS

35

In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia began by framing
207
his analysis in the historical language of trespass. He then discussed
the common law trespass approach, citing to Olmstead before acknowledging the reasonable expectation of privacy approach devel208
He continued by explaining that “the Katz reasonaoped in Katz.
ble-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
209
He distinguished the Court’s decicommon-law trespassory test.”
sion in United States v. Karo because the container with the tracking
device was not originally in that defendant’s possession when the surveillance tool was inserted into the container, whereas Jones always
210
had a possessory interest in his vehicle. Thus, the Court held that
the installation and use of the GPS to monitor Jones’s movements
211
constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In a concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, lambasted the
212
Intrespass theory espoused by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.
stead, he promoted the reasonable expectation of privacy approach
developed in Katz and its progeny, maintaining that that decision “finally did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not
213
The Katz test prorequired for a Fourth Amendment violation.”
vides the flexibility to adapt to new technologies and ensure that privacy interests are protected.
Finally, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a concurring opinion acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment may be concerned “with
214
trespassory intrusions on property.” However, she also recognized
that “[i]n cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance
that do not depend upon a physical invasion of property, the majority
215
opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.” In supporting both the majority’s trespassory approach as well as the reasonable
expectation of privacy from Katz, she calls into question the line of
207
208
209

210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 949.
Id. at 949–50.
Id. at 952 (emphases in original); see also Arcila, supra note 200, at 14 (noting that the Katz
conundrum centered on whether the Court meant “to replace property with privacy, or
merely to supplement property with privacy”). At least for Justice Scalia, it is the latter.
See id. at 69 (“Justice Scalia’s approach holds the promise of expanding Fourth Amendment protections by doubling the conceptual bases upon which such safeguards can be
claimed.”).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (discussing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707, 712 (1984)).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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cases emanating from Smith v. Maryland that indicated that individuals have no privacy interest in information accessible to third parties
such as telecommunications providers. Specifically, she characterized
“[t]his approach [as] ill suited to the digital age,” calling for an end
216
to “treat[ing] secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”
In Jones, the Supreme Court muddled the development of the al217
Yet, it is clear that
ready hazy Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
the Court—based on a unanimous judgment—provides the message
that individual privacy rights remain strong concerning new surveil218
Indeed, with the myriad theories espoused by
lance technologies.
the Justices, individuals now may raise several arguments to support
heightened standards to protect individual privacy rights in their location data.
B. Recent Developments in Technology Establish that Probable Cause Is
Required Where Cell Site Data Establish a Cell Phone User’s Location
Information
It is understandable that law enforcement officials would favor
seeking approval for a cell tower dump based on the “specific and articulable facts” standard because it is easier to satisfy than establishing
probable cause. In seeking to apply the “specific and articulable
facts” standard, many courts have rejected arguments that probable
cause and the Fourth Amendment must be applied to requests for

216
217

218

Id. at 955, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311
(2012) (addressing the potential emergence of a “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment where a search is established based on an approach of aggregating government action); see also Arcila, supra note 199, at 50–64 (discussing the use of the mosaic theory in
the context of GPS tracking and the resulting debate regarding this approach).
See Arcila, supra note 199, at 17 (“[E]ach of the three opinions produced in Jones holds
the potential to be important in the future development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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historical cell site data.219 Other courts have determined that proba220
ble cause is necessary for such information.
In discussing the appropriate standard, District Judge Nicholas
Garaufis explained that a request for cell site information raises a
greater concern than a request for a tracking device on a vehicle:
The cell-site-location records at issue here currently enable the tracking
of the vast majority of Americans. Thus, the collection of cell-sitelocation records effectively enables “mass” or “wholesale” electronic surveillance, and raises greater Fourth Amendment concerns than a single
electronically surveilled car trip. This further supports the court’s conclusion that cell-phone users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term cell-site-location records and that the Government’s ob221
taining these records constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.

Similarly, Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin has explained that there is
a problem with the government’s approach to surveillance using cell
site data: “The probable cause affidavit for CSLI rarely suggests that
every activity in the target’s life is illegal activity, yet receipt of CSLI
will permit the government to ‘follow’ the phone user’s movements
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, wherever they go, whatever they are do222
ing.” Consequently, he concluded that the appropriate course is to
“insist on strict adherence to the requirements of Rule 41 on all requests for CSLI, including requests for historical data. The warrants
223
will be granted only on a showing of probable cause . . . .”

219

220

221
222
223

United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388–389 (D. Md. 2012); United States v.
Benford, No 2:09CR86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2–*3 (N.D. Ind. 2010); In re Applications of
U.S. for Orders Pursuant To Title 18, U.S. Code Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80–
81 (D. Mass. 2007) (reversing In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant To Title 18,
U.S. Code Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Information and Historical Cell Site Information, 509 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2007), in which a magistrate judge held that
probable cause was required for the disclosure of historical cell site information); see also
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16, at 41 (“Law enforcement investigators
may use a search warrant or an order under section 2703(d) of title 18 in order to obtain
historical records from cellular carriers.”).
Eastern New York Order 1, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125 (E.D.N.Y 2011); Southern Texas Order 2,
747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837–40 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Western Texas Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571,
583–84 (W.D. Tex. 2010); Western Pennsylvania Order, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa.
2008); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical CellSite Information, No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010); In re
Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Nos. C-12-755M, C-12756M, C-12-757M, 2012 WL 3260215, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2012). In the interest of
full disclosure, this latter decision is one that I issued.
Eastern New York Order 1, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 119–20.
Western Texas Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
Id. at 583–84; see also Freiwald, supra note 65, at 691 n.65 (addressing the application of
Rule 41 and arguing that obtaining historical cell site location data is a search pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment).
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Finally, Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith addressed a government
application for historical cell site information. First, he noted that
“new technology has altered the legal landscape even more pro224
Based on these developments in
foundly than the new case law.”
technology, he explained that “court decisions allowing the Government to compel cell site data without a probable cause warrant were
based on yesteryear’s assumption that cell site data (especially from a
225
Analyzing
single tower) could locate users only imprecisely.”
Maynard, he determined that historical cell site data was subject to
226
Fourth Amendment protections. After distinguishing Smith v. Maryland, Judge Smith concluded that prolonged surveillance barred an
order for two months of cell site location records unless a warrant was
227
obtained.
On appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, District Judge Lynn
Hughes overruled the Government’s objections, explaining that
“[w]hen the government requests records from cellular services, data
disclosing the location of the telephone at the time of particular calls
228
In
may be acquired only by a warrant issued on probable cause.”
the applications before the court, because the requested “records
would show the date, time, called number, and location of when the
call was made,” this information was “constitutionally protected from
229
Most significantly, Judge Hughes concluded that
this intrusion.”
“[t]he standard under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
230
§ 2703(d), is below that required by the Constitution.” As historical
cell site data would reveal an individual’s location, such intrusion by
the government constitutes a search requiring a showing of probable
cause.
The Government appealed the order upholding Judge Smith’s
denial of the application as well as Judge Hughes’ order. In a recent
decision with a divided panel, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district

224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Southern Texas Order 2, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 830; see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 145
(discussing Judge Smith’s opinion).
Southern Texas Order 2, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (citation omitted).
Id. at 838–40.
Id. at 846.
Order on Objections, In re Applications of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, Misc.
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2011) (No. H-11-223) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id.
Id. The Government has appealed the order upholding Judge Smith’s denial of the application. See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, appeal docketed, No. 11-20884
(5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011). Any decision by the Fifth Circuit may provide guidance on some
issues regarding cell site data and surveillance, but will not address cell tower dumps.
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court.231 The majority opinion initially concluded that it could not
232
avoid the constitutional question addressed by the district court.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit determined that the production of historical cell site records that were maintained as business records by
233
the telecommunications providers was not per se unconstitutional.
In a dissenting opinion, one circuit judge expressed dismay at the
majority’s opinion, noting that it was not only incorrect, but it creat234
ed a circuit split on two issues with the Third Circuit. He took issue
with the majority’s conclusion that a magistrate must issue a
§ 2703(d) order whenever the Government satisfies the “reasonable
235
Significantly, the dissenting judge arand articulable” standard.
gued that the statute was ambiguous as to when a warrant should be
236
required. Because the dissenting judge “concluded that the statute
is best construed as directing that warrant procedures be followed
when the government seeks non-consent records that may be protected by the Fourth Amendment,” he would have held “that historical cell site location records constitute one example of this potentially
237
protected information,” and thus, a warrant should be obtained.
In the end, the majority opinion noted that the issue decided was
a narrow one: “Section 2703(d) order to obtain historical cell site information for specified cell phones at the points at which the user
238
places and terminates a call are not categorically unconstitutional.”
Specifically, the court further explained that the decision does not
address, among other issues, applications “requesting data from all
phones that use a tower during a particular interval,” or for requests
of “location information for the duration of the calls or when the
239
In other words, the court explicitly indicated that
phone is idle.”
the decision did not address cell tower dumps. Moreover, the decision does not apply where the government would seek the cell site lo231
232
233
234
235

236
237
238
239

See generally In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884, 2013 WL
3914484 (5th Cir. July 30, 2013).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *8–12.
Id. at *13 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing Third Circuit Order, 620 F.3d 304, 315–17 (3d Cir.
2010)).
Id. at *16 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[A] showing of reasonable suspicion clearly is a necessary condition for the issuance of a § 2703(d) order, but not a sufficient condition. Contrary to the assertions of the government and the majority, nowhere does the statute by its
terms require a court to issue a § 2703(d) order whenever the government’s application
demonstrates reasonable suspicion.”).
Id. at *18 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Id. at *24.
Id. at *12 (majority opinion).
Id.
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cation data of cellphones even when they are not being used to make
or receive calls.
With the circuit split and numerous decisions at the district court
level, there is still significant support for requiring probable cause for
historical cell site data. This requirement is especially true where the
government is seeking prospective cell site location information or
similar data for all times when the cell phone is turned on but not
240
engaged in a telephone call.
C. There Are a Number of Issues with the Government’s Approach to Cell
Tower Dumps that Call for Reconsideration and Reform
When seeking a cell tower dump, the government typically files an
application using its one-size-fits-all form to obtain the specific order
regarding electronic surveillance sought in a given investigation. Indeed, the Department of Justice provides its Assistant United States
Attorneys with a form application for a § 2703(d) court order as well
as form order approving the application that they are to file with the
241
court seeking any relief pursuant to § 2703(d). Often, the Assistant
United States Attorney filing the application seeking an order for
some kind of sophisticated electronic surveillance does not understand the technology and has difficulty explaining it or responding to
242
questions regarding its operation. Similarly, the case agents typically do not understand how the surveillance equipment works. Apparently, they rely on a few agents and consultants around the country
who often testify as experts regarding this form of electronic surveil243
lance.
Further compounding the problem is that the government’s applications are, as a matter of course, filed ex parte under seal. Of
244
course, it is important that these applications be filed under seal.
240
241
242

243

244

See, e.g., Western Texas Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing applications requesting around-the-clock-cell site location information).
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 16 at 162–65.
See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for An Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2012). In
the interest of full disclosure, this decision is one that I issued.
In re United States ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), Nos. C-12-670M,
C-12-671M, C-12-672M, C-12-673M, 2012 WL 4717778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012).
Of course, this lack of understanding may stem from an attempt by law enforcement to
avoid acknowledging the use of sensitive electronic surveillance techniques. See, e.g., Pell
& Soghoian, supra note 8 at 158.
Catherine Crump & Christopher Calabrese, Location Tracking: Muddled and Uncertain
Standards Harm Americans’ Privacy, 88 CRIM. L. REP. 19, 21 (2010) (“For legitimate reasons,
applications to track cell phones are often filed under seal. Law enforcement agents
sometimes need to prevent the targets of government surveillance from learning that
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Nonetheless, even magistrate judges have a difficult time ascertaining
how other judges are addressing these issues. Instead, we must rely
on word-of-mouth and caucusing with various colleagues. In applying
this approach, for example, I did not receive any responses from the
magistrate judges involved in Capito, Duffey, or Soto.
Notwithstanding the debate within the federal courts about what
standard applies for historical cell site data, the “specific and articulable facts” standard is more problematic concerning cell tower
dumps given the volume of information that law enforcement offi245
However, as the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones
cials receive.
demonstrates, law enforcement agents who use electronic surveillance should avoid pushing the envelope, as it just takes one decision
246
to adversely impact a significant number of criminal prosecutions.
It is quite likely that there are a number of prosecutors and law enforcement officials scrambling post-Jones to ensure that convictions
247
are not jeopardized or overturned. Indeed, as a result of Jones, the

245

246

247

they are investigative subjects.”); see also Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered:
Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 315 (2012) (“Of course, some
measure of temporary secrecy for electronic surveillance orders during a criminal investigation is both reasonable and necessary. Premature disclosure to the target or the general public could jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing investigation and encourage the
target to flee or destroy evidence.”).
See Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS.
L.J. 1035, 1087 (2011) (“[S]uch a low standard, combined with technological vulnerabilities and volume of information, may create the unintended consequence of a loss of protections for [private information].”). Of course, law enforcement officials typically favor
this lower standard because “procuring a search warrant, based on probable cause, is too
time-consuming and slows down an investigation.” Somini Sengupta, For Congress, a Question of Cellphone Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:22 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/for-congress-a-question-of-cellphonetracking/.
See Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal Prosecution, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (2006) ( “[A] mega-trend affecting the federal landscape [of an
area of criminal law] stems from one case.”); Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the
Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 987, 988 (2003) ( “[A] single case so profoundly changes the legal landscape.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
placement of a GPS tracking unit on a defendant’s car did not violate the Fourth
Amendment), vacated Cuevas-Perez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012) (remanding
“for further consideration in light of United States v. Jones”); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he police did not conduct an impermissible search of Pineda-Moreno’s car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking
devices.”), vacated Pineda-Moreno v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012) (remanding
“for further consideration in light of United States v. Jones”). On remand in PinedaMoreno, the Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction because there was other evidence that
supported the traffic stop and, ultimately, the conviction. United States v. PinedaMoreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2012). However, in Cuevas-Pineda, the trial
court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the indictment. United States v. Cue-
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FBI General Counsel reported that his agency “turn[ed] off about
248
3,000 GPS tracking devices that were in use.”
This new surveillance technology cannot be ignored. Moreover,
other technological developments are sure to follow. However, the
use of the specific and articulable standard to support the use of cell
tower dumps is, at best, ill-advised. Ideally, Congress would enter the
debate and provide a statutory basis consistent with the Constitution.
The longer that Congress waits to provide new legislation, the more
outdated the present statutes become regarding the various new developments in electronic surveillance. Unfortunately, Congress
seems loath to initiate any legislation, including that which addresses
electronic surveillance. As scholars have noted, “Historically, Congress has dragged its heels in protecting communications privacy un249
til the courts have demanded it.” Indeed, the governors of Rhode
Island and California have rejected legislation regarding surveillance
250
of cell phones.

248

249

250

vas-Perez, No. 4:09-CR-40009 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013). Similarly, district courts have also
suppressed evidence from warrantless GPS searches based on Jones. See United States v.
Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 526–43 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that the warrantless search
required the exclusion of evidence obtained from the GPS); United States v. Lee, 862 F.
Supp. 2d 560, 570–71 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation
to suppress the evidence from a warrantless GPS search); see also United States v. Lee, No.
6:11-CR-65, 2012 WL 1880636 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2012) (report and recommendation).
Finally, state courts have also suppressed evidence obtained from warrantless GPS searches; see generally State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 2012) (reversing and remanding
based on Jones); State v. Johnson, 964 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 2012) (vacating conviction and
remanding in light of Jones); State v. Winningham, 969 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio 2012) (same);
State v. Sayles, 969 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio 2012) (same); State v. Jefferson, 969 N.E.2d 250
(Ohio 2012) (same); State v. Sullivan, 969 N.E.2d 250 (Ohio 2012) (same); State v.
White, 969 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio 2012) (same); People v. Robinson, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012)
(same).
Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-offthousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling; accord Arcila, supra note 199, at 5.
Freiwald, supra note 65, at 687; see also Bankston, supra note 69, at 631 (calling for Congress to update the Stored Communications Act); Western Texas Order, 727 F. Supp. 2d
571, 573 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (“As technology has advanced, new investigative tools have become available that federal law does not explicitly address.”). But see Kerr, supra note 50,
at 858–59 (“Courts lack the institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications
of new technologies they encounter. Judges cannot readily understand how the technologies may develop, cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize
whether the facts of the case before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or atypical. Judicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they cannot change
quickly and cannot test various regulatory approaches.”). Indeed, in 2000, the House Judiciary Committee fashioned a bill regarding the standards for prospective cell site location data, but that bill ultimately died. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 8, at 159–60.
See, e.g., Hanni Fakhoury, Governor Brown Vetoes California Electronic Privacy Protection.
Again., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
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In the absence of new legislation with standards specifically addressing cell tower dumps, courts must address the issues. As Professor Orin Kerr has argued, “[c]hanging technology can outpace the
assumptions of existing precedents, and courts may need to tweak
prior doctrine to restore the balance of privacy protection from an
251
earlier age.” Of course, technology can change so dramatically that
existing statutes may no longer adequately address privacy concerns.
Moreover, if Congress were to enact new legislation regarding electronic surveillance, then “every reasonable construction must be re252
sorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” However, courts may not find any such new laws constitutional if the
standard for electronic surveillance intruding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy is less than the issuance of a warrant based on a
probable cause standard. Congress can create any standard it likes,
but whatever standard it creates, it will eventually be subjected to ju253
dicial review and must pass constitutional muster.
In discussing requests for court orders, warrants, and subpoenas
with various case agents, I always stressed that denying orders that fail
to satisfy the standard is not just doing right by the Constitution and
254
These
the applicable statutes, but also benefiting society as well.
agents do not want to have a conviction hinge on—and potentially be
overturned—because of an order or warrant that does not satisfy the
255
This argument has been made easier by the Supreme
standard.
Court’s decision in Jones, because some agents are now furiously
working to determine what, if anything, they need to do to salvage

251
252

253

254

255

deeplinks/2012/10/governor-browns-vetoes-california-electronic-privacy-protectionagain; Somini Sengupta, Courts Divided over Searches of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2012, at A1 (Governor Lincoln Chafee vetoed a bill that would have compelled police to
obtain a warrant to search a cell phone).
Kerr, supra note 216, at 344.
See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971) (“It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.” (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
See, e.g., Gerald S. Reamey, When ‘Special Needs’ Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit
of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 340 (1992) (“If the constitutional scheme requires
probable cause and a warrant for searches designed to produce criminal evidence, it is
hard to imagine what further societal need would be so significant that its presence
should reduce the standard of suspicion and judicial review.”).
See, e.g., David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 698 (2007)
(“[P]olice will adopt whatever tactics they can aggressively implement if they can increase
their conviction rate and not be overturned on appeal . . . .”).
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cases involving a Jones-like search. Moreover, Jones has demonstrated
that the courts are willing to act as a check on government investigations regarding electronic surveillance. That is particularly true because Jones was a unanimous judgment from a Court that routinely is256
sues decisions split along ideological lines.
In the absence of any legislative guidance from Congress, the
courts must develop jurisprudence. As evident by the various cases,
there are a significant number of decisions by magistrate judges as
well as some district judges addressing § 2703. However, the government generally appears opposed to appealing adverse decisions to
federal appellate courts—no doubt interested in avoiding creating
bad case law. Consequently, with the exception of the Third Circuit
and the Fifth Circuit decisions, there are no federal appellate decisions addressing historical cell site data and the standards to be ap257
plied. Moreover, these are the only two appellate decisions in over
eight years that these issues have been raised before district courts
around the country. Given this slow pace, it is unlikely that there will
be any new decisions soon, and even more unlikely that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari and issue a decision with definitive guidance on this issue. Indeed, the procedural posture of these ex parte
applications makes it more unlikely that there will be any Supreme
Court decisions.
Based on the Fourth Amendment and developing case law, requests for cell tower dumps should not be handled through applications pursuant to § 2703. The provision of location information invades numerous individuals’ privacy rights. This is evident on
remand in the Jones case, where the Government can no longer establish the defendant's whereabouts after the Supreme Court’s Jones decision based on the defendant's GPS records, it subsequently sought
to establish the defendant's location based on his cell site location da258
ta records. Instead, requests for access to such information should
be filed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such a warrant must satisfy the probable cause standard based

256

257
258

See Mark R. Killenbeck, William Johnson, The Dog That Did Not Bark?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 407,
409 n.11 (2009) (noting media reports of frequent “5-to-4 decision splits along ideological lines” in recent years); Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very
Tiny Constable: Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 113, 113–14
(2012) (”Although the Justices all agreed that the government's conduct amounted to a
search, the reasoning of the case was hotly disputed.”).
Because the Government prevailed before the Fifth Circuit in its ex parte application,
there is no party to seek Supreme Court review even though there is a circuit split.
Kerr, supra note 216, at 322 n.72.
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on the totality of the circumstances.259 Indeed, to the extent that the
information the government seeks constitutes a tracking device, a
warrant is the appropriate manner in which judicial authorization for
260
such a device is provided.
In addition to satisfying the probable cause standard, applications
for cell tower dumps should provide some safeguards for individuals
who are not subjects of the criminal investigation whose personal information will nonetheless be gathered in the course of the dump.
261
The Wiretap Act, which authorizes wiretaps, provides some guid262
ance.
263
First, the statute not only requires a probable cause standard,
but also mandates that a wiretap should only be authorized after
“normal investigative procedures have been tried and have or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too danger264
ous.” In other words, a cell tower dump should not be used as a big
fishing expedition. This approach is “designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative
265
In other words,
techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”
wiretapping is an investigative approach that should be the last resort
for law enforcement officials. Similarly, a cell tower dump can serve a
useful purpose in criminal investigations, but it should be the last approach used after various other methods, including pen registers and
trap and trace devices and orders issued pursuant to § 2703 as well as
other non-electronic investigative techniques. For example, in the
bank robbery scenario involving multiple crime scenes, the investigat-

259
260
261
262
263

264
265

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); accord United States v. Settegast, 755 F.2d 1117,
1121 (5th Cir. 1985).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
See Freiwald, supra note 65, at 747–48 (positing that the Wiretap Act protections should
apply to historical cell site searches).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1998) (wiretap may be authorized upon a showing of “probable
cause for the belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense”); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b) (1998) (wiretap may be authorized upon a showing of “probable cause for the belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception”); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d)
(wiretap may be authorized upon a showing of “probable cause for the belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral or electronic communications are to
be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense”); see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 532–33 (1974)
(discussing these subsections).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c); accord Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 463 (1977);
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974).
Kahn, 415 U.S. at 153 n.12 (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097, (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112 (Apr. 29, 1968)).
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ing agents should be provided only the cell phone numbers from
each cell tower dump, as opposed to all the other information typically requested. Then, they can compare the cell phone numbers to determine whether there are any matches at more than one crime scene. If such matches exist, they can then obtain the additional
information associated with the matching cell phone numbers.
Second, the wiretap statute dictates that the interceptions of
communications “shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to intercep266
For purposes of applications seeking cell tower dumps, the
tion.”
government should not only seek to minimize the intrusion into the
private lives of individuals who are not the subject of the ongoing
criminal investigation, but provide an explanation of how it intends
to minimize this intrusion. Any application should address what protocol will be employed to deal with the numerous telephone numbers
and other information obtained that do not have any role in the pur267
Such a protocol would include an explaported criminal offense.
nation of methodology in obtaining the telephone numbers as well as
an explanation about how non-relevant numbers would be disposed
of after the investigation and any subsequent prosecution had concluded.
Third, the individuals whose personal information was swept up in
the cell tower dump during the course of the criminal investigation
should be notified by either the telecommunications provider or the
government after such reasonable time that notification would not
268
If an individual’s
jeopardize the ongoing criminal investigation.
home or other property were searched pursuant to a search warrant,
then notice would be required pursuant to Rule 41. Here, notice of
the government’s access to individuals’ personal information should
not go unreported to the affected individuals. Surely, some of the
150,000 persons with information compromised in Capito, or the 179
persons in Soto whose records were investigated and made publicly
266
267

268

18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1978) (discussing minimization of the interception of non-relevant telephone calls).
See
In
re
Search
of
Cellular
Telephone
Towers,
Nos.
C-13-523M,
C-13-525M, C-13-526M, C-13-527M, C-13-528M, 2013 WL 1932881, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. May
8, 2013).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (providing that persons whose telephone communications are
intercepted be notified within 90 days); see also United States v. Dalia, 441 U.S. 238, 248
(1979) (“In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977), we held that Title
III provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for advance notice by requiring that
once the surveillance operation is completed the authorizing judge must cause notice to
be served on those subjected to surveillance.”).
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available would like to be aware of that situation. This measure
would enable persons affected by the investigation who are ultimately
not targets of the investigation to ensure that their most personal data are not compromised. They should be told what information of
theirs the government obtained and what the government plans to do
with it after the criminal investigation and any prosecution is concluded.
The use of these simple measures could ensure that everyone’s
constitutional rights are properly safeguarded. Moreover, it would
provide those whose records were accessed with knowledge as well as
the ability to prevent improper or illegal use of their personal information.
CONCLUSION
This Article does not seek to ban the use of cell tower dumps. In
certain contexts, cell tower dumps can be extremely useful. For example, in the classic scenario of a team of bank robbers who have a
similar method of robbing various banks in an area, a cell tower
dump with the proper safeguards can be an effective, and constitu269
tional, law enforcement weapon.
The problem with cell tower dumps is that the federal government typically applies for them pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703. However, this statute does not address cell tower dumps. Additionally, the
Fourth Amendment has evolved to provide privacy protections for
new electronic surveillance techniques, including cell tower dumps.
People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell site location information recorded by cellular providers.
Ultimately, it would be preferable for Congress to enact new legislation specifically addressing cell tower dumps, but that has not yet
happened and does not appear likely in the near future. Any new
legislation would still have to adhere to constitutional mandates or
risk being found unconstitutional. Indeed, even the Fifth Circuit, in
alluding to cell tower dumps, has distinguished them from applications for historical cell site information.
Applications for cell tower dumps should seek warrants based on a
demonstration of probable cause to obtain the cell site location information. Moreover, law enforcement officials and the courts
269

See generally Brian L. Owsley, Cops and Robbers: The Use of Cell Tower Dumps to Investigate
Bank Robberies, AMER. CRIM. L. REV. (2013), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/
Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/cops-and-robbers-use-cell-tower-dumps-investigate-bankrobberies-01-26-2013.
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should address the privacy rights of third-party individuals whose information is obtained through cell tower dumps. Such individuals
need to be notified when law enforcement officials obtain their information. There also needs to be a mechanism whereby this private
information is no longer in the government’s possession once the
criminal investigation or prosecution has concluded.
In the end, protocols and probable cause with a warrant will ensure that privacy rights are balanced and protected against law enforcement’s interest in using electronic surveillance such as cell tower
dumps to further criminal investigations.

